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Abstract 
Background: During 2014 and 2015, Sierra Leone suffered the worst Ebola outbreak 
registered, which also affected Guinea and Liberia. The Government of Sierra Leone, 
supported by the World Health Organization, issued an accelerated response plan to reduce 
morbidity and mortality due to Ebola. This plan was initially built on previous experiences in 
Ebola outbreaks in other countries, albeit much less severe than this current outbreak. The 
response plan included Communication and Social Mobilization as one of its pillars. 
Aim: The aim of this degree project was to explore the use and contribution of health 
communication during the implementation of a health policy. This was achieved through 
identifying the health communications strategies used in Sierra Leone during the 2014-2015 
Ebola outbreak, in the context of other implementation activities.  
Methods: This is a qualitative exploratory single case study covering a timeframe from April 
2014 to April 2015 using thematic content analysis. Data from high-profile key informants 
was collected using semi-structured interviews. Documents from UNICEF and UNMEER 
were also analysed.  
Results: Health communication was used actively in the Ebola response in Sierra Leone, and 
its utilization changed over time in order to adapt to the outbreak situation and lessons learnt. 
The interviews highlighted moments and decision making during the response and jointly 
with the documents enabled identifying trends in strategies. It was possible to understand the 
rationale and context behind health communication decisions, studying communication styles 
changes over time and identifying particular lessons learned.  
Conclusion: Five main phases were identified in health communication usage during the 
Ebola response in Sierra Leone, each one characterized by a unique communication style, 
specific messages according to the outbreak situation or a different approach in the 
implementation of the response plan. Some best practices from the studied Ebola response in 
Sierra Leone were also highlighted. 
Keywords: Ebola, Sierra Leone, health communication, health policy implementation, quali-
tative research, social mobilization. 
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Ebola entered Sierra Leone from the farthest east district of Kailahun to the economic 
and political heart of the country using a similar path as the rebel war in 1991. It 
followed the same roads and routes as the rebels from the Revolutionary United Front, 
finally storming into the Western District and the capital, Freetown (1). 
Background 
Ebola Virus Disease in Sierra Leone 
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) is a severe illness caused by the Ebola virus, which is transmit-
ted by direct contact with body fluids. It was formerly known as Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever 
and can reach a fatality rate up to 90% (2). 
The first Ebola outbreak in the history of West Africa, and the largest recorded in the 
world was declared on 21 March 2014 (week 12
1
). The index case was traced to south Guinea 
in late December 2013. Three countries in this region, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, had 
widespread and intense disease transmission during the current outbreak. Nigeria and Mali 
had a small number of cases while Senegal had one but these foci were contained and the 
spread was stopped in those territories (3). At the end of this thesis project Liberia had not had 
a new case in 4 weeks and a steep decline in number of cases had occurred also in Guinea and 
Sierra Leone, the other two mainly affected countries. 
The government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) confirmed the first case of EVD in the country on 
26 May 2014 (week 22). In December 2014 (week 49) Sierra Leone had the worst outlook in 
this epidemic in the West African region showing little signs to decrease.  
Sierra Leone is currently classified under the low income countries group by the World 
Bank (4).It is still recovering from the unrest of the civil war, which ended in 2002, when its 
health infrastructures were severely damaged or destroyed (3). The health system was frag-
mented as a result, in part, of traditional vertically-structured donor initiatives in Sub Saharan 
Africa focused in fighting specific diseases instead of building a strong health system (5).  
 The Ebola outbreak diverted the health system’s attention from formerly prevalent diseas-
es such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. The whole population of Sierra Leone lives 
in areas with high malaria transmission, which is one of the main causes of deaths from infec-
tious diseases (3,6). During the outbreak, 80% of the institutions offering services for women 
with HIV closed (7) and, also, the access to prenatal care, immunization and inpatient and 
outpatient health services, among other, were affected (8,9).  
                                                 
1
 Week numbers refer to the number of week of the year, each new week starting on a Monday as in WHO Ebola 
situation reports.  
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The Ministry of Health and Sanitation of Sierra Leone (MoHS), developed an Accelerated 
Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak Response Plan (ARP) (10), covering the period between July 
and December 2014 (weeks 31 to 52). The goal of this plan was to reduce morbidity and mor-
tality due to Ebola through prompt identification, notification and effective management of 
cases, effective social mobilization and coordination of the outbreak response activities.  
The aforementioned response plan included established activities and budgeting for four 
thematic areas, later known as pillars:  
1. Coordination, finance and logistics  
2. Epidemiology and laboratory 
3. Case management and infection prevention and control; psychosocial support 
4. Social mobilization/ Public Information 
Policy, health policy and health policy implementation 
The ARP can be considered a policy according to the characteristics proposed by Matland. 
According to this author a policy can be defined as the “programmatic activities formulated in 
response to an authoritative decision” (11). It consists of the plans required to carry out the 
wishes expressed by that legitimating organization: the GoSL and the MoHS.  
The ARP can also be considered a health policy, as it covers “courses of action and inac-
tion that affect the set of institutions, organizations, services and funding arrangements of the 
health care system (both public and private)” (12). 
Several shaping factors have been identified when talking about policies and health poli-
cies in particular. Those are reflected in the analytical model proposed by Walt and Gilson 
(13) and referred in the health policy literature as the policy triangle (12) (Figure 1, Table 1). 
The processes component in the policy triangle has been referred to as the policy cycle and 
involves the following sub components: 
agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-
making, policy implementation and policy 
evaluation (12). Policy implementation, the 
fourth stage of the foresaid policy cycle, 
could be described as the group of activities 
and operations intended to achieve the goals 
of a policy and performed by various stake-
holders (14). 
 
Figure 1: The policy triangle 
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There have been two traditional thought schools on policy implementation: for the top-
down theorists, the central actors are the policy designers and they focus on factors that can be 
manipulated at the central level. On the other hand, bottom-up theorists argue that policy is, in 
fact, created at the local level, meaning that they concentrate on target groups and service de-
livery (11).  
Health communication  
It is important to highlight that both policy implementation approaches are focused around the 
actors. In that sense, studying their interactions and specific communication characteristics 
during a health policy implementation would be a relevant field of study. One of the ways of 
studying those interactions could be using health communication. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the United States use the following def-
inition of health communication: “The study and use of communication strategies to inform 
and influence individual and community decisions that enhance health” (15). It is possible to 
find many different definitions for health communication. According to Schiavo, each one of 
them emphasizes one of several of the following topics or attributes: informing and influenc-
ing decisions; motivating individuals and key groups; changing behaviour; increasing 
knowledge and understanding of health-related issues; empowering people; exchanging, in-
terchanging information, two-way dialogue; engaging (16). All of them concern actors and 
their interactions. Schiavo also mentioned several key characteristics of health communica-
tion. One of them is that health communication must be aimed at behavioural and social re-
sults so every intervention in health communication must have clear behavioural objectives at 
individual, group, community, social and political levels.  
Table 1: Description of the components of the policy triangle 
Component Description Detail 
Content The actual text of the policy’s 
documents or the ‘spirit’ of the policy 
(if not written) 
 
Context Systemic factors which may have 
an effect on health policy 
Situational, structural, cultural, inter-
national or exogenous factors 
Processes The way in which policies are ini-
tiated, developed or formulated, nego-
tiated, communicated, implemented 
and evaluated 
Agenda setting, policy formulation, 
decision-making, policy implementation, 
policy evaluation. 
Actors  Individuals, organizations, states or 
governments 
 
 
9 
Health communication can be seen as a cyclical process, as Schiavo and Parvanta have 
stressed. Parvanta uses the cycle stated by the National Cancer Institute including 4 stages: 1) 
Planning and strategy development; 2) Developing & testing concepts messages and materi-
als; 3) Implementation and 4) Evaluation and improvements (17).  
Capacity building on other countries’ experiences 
Since the first identified outbreak in 1976, EVD containment activities have allowed some 
lessons learnt from each one of them including evidence-based best practices from the applied 
interventions, including social mobilization and behavioural interventions.  
Simultaneously as the EVD outbreak continued to spread in West Africa, on 24 August 
2014 (week 34), an EVD outbreak was declared in the Boende district in the Democratic Re-
public of Congo (DRC), caused by a variant of Ebola virus unrelated to the strain in West Af-
rica. This outbreak was declared to be over on 21 November 2014 (week 47). Successful 
practices in containing this outbreak included the availability of quick laboratory test confir-
mations, strict triage and contact tracing as well as the mobilization of communities and their 
traditional and religious leaders (18). The response in Sierra Leone would, eventually, used 
similar practices. 
In 2000, Uganda had the largest EVD outbreak before the current epidemic, and the first 
occurring in this country making it, somehow, a similar case to the one under study in this 
work. The main lesson learned from this outbreak relates to the availability of field laborato-
ry, active surveillance, resource mobilization, management of the dead, coordination and me-
dia management, case management, infection control, public information and effective 
communication and, also, the leadership and commitment from the government (19,20).  
Another well studied Ebola outbreak is the one which took place in the district of Yambio, 
Sudan, in 2004. It has been reported how communication and social mobilization strategies 
contributed to control this outbreak, specifically double way communication in order to reach 
behavioural changes. Other important interventions were related to epidemiological surveil-
lance, more humane management in isolation units and ensuring safe burial but, importantly, 
according to local traditions and holding genuine funeral ceremonies. These activities were 
developed with the help of the experience gained in previous and recent EVD outbreaks in 
Gabon, DRC and Uganda. A rather new behavioural model developed by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) was used during this outbreak: Communication for Behavioural Impact 
(COMBI) (21,22).  
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These are a few examples on how the previous Ebola outbreaks are the foundation for ac-
tions in future ones. Experiences from the management of other diseases such as HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria are probably also relevant for this case (23,24). Recommendations 
from the management of theses disease pointed in the same direction as the ones from previ-
ous Ebola outbreaks: community engagement, rapid and accessible tests, surveillance and in-
terventions to reduce stigma. 
Aim and specific objectives  
The aim of this thesis is to explore the use and contribution of health communication during 
the implementation of a health policy through identifying the health communications strate-
gies used in Sierra Leone during the 2014 Ebola outbreak, in the context of other implementa-
tion activities.  
The specific objectives of this thesis are: 
 To understand the rationale and context behind health communication decisions in Si-
erra Leone during the Ebola outbreak 
 To study communication trends changes over time, and how the strategy was adapted 
accordingly 
 To identify particular lessons learned and contributions to policy and practice from 
this specific case 
It is important to bring the attention how the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone became relevant 
in the agenda setting, how the plan was designed and tested, how the interventions were im-
plemented and how the policy makers defined a course of action.  
Methods 
This is an exploratory single case study using individual semi-structured interviews to high-
profile key informants involved in policy making and response plans development. It also 
used documents as units of analysis (Table 2). In both kind of sources, it was performed a 
thematic analysis for both manifest and latent content (25,26). 
The thematic content analysis was applied to both primary and secondary sources using 
applicable steps from the methodology proposed by Burnard (27). Coding process had both 
inductive and deductive approach. The first was based on terms from the policy triangle 
framework when related to policy implementation and the WHO Outbreak Communication 
Planning Guide and health communication terms. The latter used open coding.  
NVivo® 10 software was used for tracking of interview coding. For the weekly reports 
analysis, an Excel table was used as it allowed a more efficient time-tracking. 
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Sierra Leone was selected as the setting for this study due to several reasons: 1) At the time 
of developing the agenda for this thesis, Sierra Leone was most severely hit by the outbreak, 
showing little signs for improvement. 2) Use of English as official language enabled more 
comprehensive data collection. 3) This thesis could benefit from the currently ongoing pro-
jects on this country at the Centre for Research on Healthcare in Disasters at the Department 
of Public Health Sciences at Karolinska Institutet. 
The selection of participants was made by a convenience sampling method during the very 
interview process but based in a preliminary list of potentially important contributors (26). It 
was based on availability of interviewees, responses to invitation and on the need of specific 
information or background. The ultimate list had seven potential interviewees including one 
in Nigeria as this country was reported as a successful case in containing the spread of EVD 
even after having reached the capital city, Lagos (3). The list included two persons from the 
GoSL, three people working or having worked in the Ebola response for international organi-
zations in this country, one NGO founder, born in Sierra Leone and with deep roots in the 
country and with experience working in the health system during the outbreak and one person 
in Nigeria, founder of an organization advising and working with the government in devel-
opment and implementation of communication strategies. At the end four interviews were 
performed on Skype or mobile phone including one with the key informant in Nigeria. 
It was not possible to get an interview with the spokespersons in the GoSL. One person 
contacted explained that they were not able to allocate time for the interview due to being oc-
cupied with the still ongoing outbreak control effort. However, this person responded by 
email. The point of view and intended objectives from the GoSL were complemented with the 
National Ebola Communication Strategy (NECS) (28) issued in September 30 2014 (week 40) 
as part of the implementation of the ARP.  
Table 2: Summary of sources and timeframes 
Source Number Dates range covering Weeks 
Interviews  to High profile informants  4 July December 2014 27/2014-52/2014 
Written communication (e-mail message) 1 July 2014 – March 2015 27/2014-14/2015 
National Ebola Communication Strategy 1 October 2014 – April 2015 40/2014-15/2015 
Ebola Communication plan 1 April – September 2014 17/2014-39/2014 
Weekly reports UNICEF 38 21 July 2014 – 8 April 2014 30/2014-15/2015 
Weekly reports UNMEER, MoHS, UK* 22 20 October 2014 –12 April 2015 43/2014-15-2015 
Cultural Anthropology contributions 1 October 7 2014  
*UNMEER was created in September 2014. From March 16 2015 the reports were issued every other week 
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For this project, the secondary sources selected for analysis were the ARP and the NECS 
as official documents from the government as well as two kinds of periodic reports. These 
were the weekly reports issued by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Sierra 
Leone and the ones produced by United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response 
(UNMEER) and the National Emergency Response Centre, in collaboration with the United 
Kingdom, and United Nations response partners. Regarding those reports the aim was to ana-
lyse the following sections: highlights, summary analysis of programme response, progress 
overview and social mobilization and communications. Some additional examples of rumours 
were extracted from one article in Cultural Anthropology. 
This project covers documents issued between April 2014 (week 17) and April 2015 (week 
15). The interviews covered experiences from July to December 2014 (weeks 27 to 52). 
There were two kinds of documents issued by the National Ebola Response Centre which 
were not included in the complete analysis. These were the Information Management Work-
ing Group meeting minutes and the National Ebola Response Centre weekly situation news-
letter. These were excluded from the complete analysis since they lacked a specific focus on 
health communication and, instead, focused mostly on numeric results. They did not provide, 
either, so much information or they were published after the week 1, 2015. However they 
provided some useful contextual information.  
The chosen methods provided some specific benefits for this project. It was considered that 
interviewing different kinds of key contacts would provide an insight to the use of health 
communication and how it was perceived by different stakeholders, including the GoSL. A 
semi-structured interview approach enabled comparable information in common topics and 
also had specific insights from each personal point of view. The standard interview question-
naire was developed based on concepts from a literature review as to the different components 
of a successful health communication program. The selected secondary sources allowed to 
contrast the thoughts from interviewees against documents and had the additional benefit of 
providing an overview of evolution of Ebola response over time.  
Ethical Considerations 
All key informants who contributed to this project were afforded anonymity so as to not jeop-
ardize their professional reputation or work. They were also somehow protected by the exten-
sive use of published reports as the burden of supporting conclusions was not only in the 
participants’ contributions but also distributed to public documents. This also contributed to 
the reliability of the results and conclusions making worthy their support to this project. 
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Interview recordings and transcriptions were kept in the researcher’s personal password 
protected computer. After finishing these work files were removed from those location and 
remain in an external hard disk kept by the author.  
No ethical approval was requested for this project as it was not considered posing potential 
harm for participants in its current design. 
Results 
The data compilation can be divided into three sections: interviews, weekly reports and other 
documents. Four interview transcripts and one email compose the first section, the latter sent 
by a representative of the GoSL. The second one, corresponding to weekly reports included 
38 reports issued by UNICEF and 21 by UNMEER (Table 2). Each one of the reports series 
covers a different timeframe although both finish in the week 15 of 2015, when the data col-
lection and analysis was completed. These documents allowed the identification of themes in 
the reports and the organization of them according to specific categories over time. The third 
section comprises other kinds of documents including: the ARP, the NECS, as well as addi-
tional published documents. These documents allowed identifying strategic decisions from the 
government of Sierra Leone and contextual consideration regarding to them as well as the 
communication goals and styles expected to achieve. 
Narrative over time 
At the beginning 
Data from interviews highlighted the importance of understanding the socio-cultural context 
both when implementing a health policy and when developing health communication initia-
tives in support of that implementation. In the specific Sierra Leonean case the context in-
clude a recent civil war, a country in reconstruction, an extremely weak health system caused 
by the war and poverty condition, government inefficiencies and corruption, among other 
possible causes, and a profound mistrust against the government and the international com-
munity represented by international organizations, as stated by three of the participants.  
The data from the interviews suggested that at the beginning of the outbreak people reject-
ed going to the Ebola treatment centres. Non-attendance at the Ebola centres can be attributed 
to several different reasons. In some instances this could be caused by disbelief as to the ex-
istence of Ebola. Avoidance of treatment centres was also recorded premised on the belief that 
it was unnecessary as Ebola was deadly and incurable. Rumours about the theft of organs 
from dead bodies were also a reason for not visiting the Ebola treatment centres. The same 
sources also said that people started going to get care because it was proved that Ebola was 
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killing traditional healers and local health workers, not because an increased level of trust on 
the government but because they did not have any other places to go. 
 “People do not trust the state and then they didn’t trust the information that the state put out 
either. So, when they started talk about Ebola from the beginning people didn’t believe it …. At 
least not- in Sierra Leone, but also they did not trust the government when they said you need to 
behave in a certain way… But the second point when it comes to trust is that they don’t trust the 
international community either.”(I1). 
 “Until they saw the number of people dying that’s when they realized that by doing the right 
thing and following the message they would survive. But the mistrust was there, it was there 
because people didn’t understand what was among them.” (I1). 
Sierra Leone was not prepared to handle an outbreak of this scale. However, as stated in 
the background section, the international community had previous experience in handling 
Ebola events and that experience was applied in early stages of this case.  
“I know that even in the capital city there are a lot of facilities that do not have access to water 
and it’s essential in ensuring you have sanitation which it’s essential in controlling Ebola. A lot of 
facilities don’t have protective equipment like gloves” (I2)  
“Go to the hospital is still very expensive and difficult and also quite often quite dangerous. So 
just like Ebola but also many other diseases that are spread through hospitals… the health 
capacity is not there.” (I1)  
“Lack of experience among health care workers and limited capacities for rapid response” 
(NECS) 
There is evidence that already in April 2014 (week 17), before the first case was confirmed 
in Sierra Leone, some actions were taken to prepare the country in the health communication 
field given the already identified cases in the neighbour Guinea. It can be found a communi-
cation plan dated in that month (29). But one of the interviewees, involved in the response 
plan development, stated that at the beginning it was placed in a hurry. There was no mention 
of the first step of the implementation or the communication cycles: planning.  
“So in terms of communication strategies … so whatever strategy was in place was more or less 
something that was put together in a hurry” (I2)  
The first weekly report from UNICEF dates from first week of July (week 30) and it al-
ready spoke of the draft version of the ARP. In the ARP itself it says it was prepared in the 
first week of July (week 22) in a Health Ministries meeting promoted by WHO regional office 
for Africa. Guinea and Liberia were also present and they also issued accelerated response 
plans. In the ARP it is where it is mentioned for the first time the use of experiences from 
previous outbreaks. In this case, the experiences from Uganda and DRC. 
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Around September 
From the interviews, it was learnt that during September 2014 (weeks 36 to 40), a perceived 
improvement in the response plan occurred, a new phase was starting and people perceived 
that the government was finally acting. It was just a couple of days before the start of this 
month, on August 29
th
 (week 35), when the Minister of Health and Sanitation was removed 
from her position and replaced by her deputy (30). Also in September, the NECS was issued 
and the House to House campaign (‘Ose to Ose Ebola Tok’), also known as the lockdown, 
took place. 
 “Came out one of the positives thing that came out from that exercise was a revision of the 
social mobilization approaches, revision of the communication approaches.” (I2)  
In this unique situation the leadership from the authorities was especially important. In 
some way the government’s own leadership produced a turning point in the outbreak re-
sponse. 
“And I thought that really made the difference because when we went out (…) to the 
communities. There were no people in the streets, no because of the police but because the people 
said what the president said. And I thought that that was very good, political leadership and 
commitment” (I2)  
“But it still say, still say, I mean that’s a good example I mean at the end it didn’t help much for-
- It didn’t help much to curve the Ebola crisis but in the other hand it showed people that we have a 
government that is actually ready to act for us” (I1). 
The data from interviews and documents show that during the initial stage the communica-
tion efforts were placed in mass media communication and only after September it appears 
more frequently the door-to-door communication and interpersonal communication. Also in 
September, the first results of the Knowledge, Attitudes and Perceptions (KAP) survey were 
revealed (week 38). The national government performed this survey in order to fully under-
stand the population and its beliefs about EVD as well as to identify the most appropriate 
mode of communication. Results from this survey were used as evidence-based foundations 
for the NECS.  
“There is a high level of awareness about Ebola but misconceptions also remain high. It was 
highlighted that attitudes towards Ebola survivors may face high levels of stigma, shame and 
discrimination from communities, which is undermining their ability to recover their livelihoods 
and continue their lives – including children who have been affected. The survey also underlined 
the importance of providing information via radio broadcast messaging…” UNICEF Sierra Leone 
Humanitarian Situation Report – Reporting Period 15-21 September 2014 
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In September 30 2014 (week 40), the GoSL issued the NECS as a guiding document for 
the Social Mobilization pillar. The strategy was aimed to “contribute to end transmission to 
social mobilization and public education that supported desired behaviour changes” (28). The 
NECS mentions several frameworks or models. The first relates to the WHO outbreak com-
munication planning guide. From this document the GoSL adapted the Quality Principles of 
communications in emergencies. The principles for WHO are: trust, announcing early, trans-
parency, listening and planning. In the NECS the GoSL did not include the first original prin-
ciple: trust. It also added some others as the mention to rumour banks, the quality control of 
messages and practicing positive communication. 
The second model is related to health communication in the sense that is a well-known be-
havioural model, the Health Belief Model (HBM), also with some adaptation. From the stand-
ard model, the GoSL included the dimensions susceptibility, benefits and barriers and 
excluded the perceived severity and including the self-efficacy concept. Finally, it also in-
cluded the cues to action, which was not originally one of the dimensions but considered as 
stimulus to trigger the decision making process (31,32).  
The third model is the RE-AIM framework for evaluation and assessment purposes in this 
policy. RE-AIM stands for reach, effectiveness, adoptability, implementation and mainte-
nance. Reach relates to the number of individuals willing to be involved in an initiative. Ef-
fectiveness is the impact of an intervention on outcomes. Adoption talks on the absolute 
number of settings and intervention agents willing to initiate a program. Implementation is 
about the agents’ fidelity to the elements of an intervention’s protocol. Maintenance is how a 
policy or intervention becomes institutionalized or part of the routine (33). 
The NECS was published four months after the first case confirmation but included com-
munication practices which were identified as already in use in older weekly reports. KAP 
was used in NECS to define the baseline on misconceptions and inaccurate knowledge in or-
der to measure advances in the communication objectives stated in the document. Those ob-
jectives were defined as a percentage of people having specific knowledge. There was no 
mention of desired behaviours in the first two communicational objectives. The remaining 
two went beyond the social mobilization and communication pillar and proposed specific ob-
jectives in avoiding stigma of survivors and number and rate of safe burials. Although these 
two corresponds to desired behaviours they required participation of the other pillars to be 
achieved with communication practices, especially the one related to safe burials.  
The national House to House campaign (‘Ose to Ose Ebola Tok’) occurred between Sep-
tember 19th and 21st 2014 (weeks 38 and 39) and reached around 95% of households (34). 
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There were five objectives during this lockdown, one of them specifically related with health 
communication: to reach 100% of households with correct information on Ebola. The other 
was related with other pillars but took advantage of health communication interventions. De-
tails on the House to house campaign are in the UNICEF weekly report of September 7
th
 2014 
(week 36) (35). 
From the interviews it was perceived that the general perception was that this national 
lockdown was a success and a turning point in Ebola response and also contributed to show-
ing that the government was doing something for the population. 
“The three home days, that in order was-- the ministry did that to have health workers be able to 
go to the homes and share information about Ebola in every single home. That was definitely 
helpful but there’s a mix feedback about that, so some people think it took away from the 
productivity”—(I4)  
“I think this lockdown in Freetown was really important because it symbolized a new way and a 
new trust for the government um-- and partly because of the spread of the virus became so massive 
so people needed, I mean, they couldn’t do anything other than, than-- accept it” (I1).  
Six months after the first House to House campaign, the GoSL prepared a new campaign 
which occurred between March 28
th
 and 30
th
 2015 (weeks 13 and 14). This is a sign of how 
useful the government perceived the first lockdown was. No conclusive results of this lock-
down were presented in the reports until the week 15 of 2015.  
At the end of 2014 and during 2015 
During the last quarter of 2014 (weeks 40 to 52), the time when EVD transmission was the 
most severe and number of cases the highest, the weekly reports showed a more intense use of 
door to door and interpersonal activities. In the same way it appears that the local leaders (re-
ligious leaders, paramount leaders, women and young leaders) played a more important role 
in the health communication strategy. At the beginning of the response, religious leaders were 
seen as a channel to deliver standard messages but during this time they participated more ac-
tively in developing local strategies and contributing to mobilize the population and to help 
authorities and international organizations to understand its concerns and fears. The response 
teams improved their ability to listen to the people and collecting feedback when using this 
approach. 
 “Because the other thing is, people rushing to develop messages and were pushing messages to 
the community, right? But their leaders were not adequately engaged so there was mistrust. The 
link between the government and the community is the community leader” (I2)  
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The end of 2014 and the first quarter of 2015 (weeks 49/2014 to 12/2015) brought the use 
of more customized messages, directed to specific parts of the population during specific 
timeframes and included also the term ‘safe and dignified burials’. The first UNICEF report 
mentioning the ‘dignified’ word is the report from November 12th 2014 (week 46) and the 
“big idea of the week” (from week 46/2014 to 15/2015) initiative started to mention the digni-
fied burials in the week 47 (although mixing it with the simplest “safe burials” message). The 
first UNMEER report, from Oct 27 2014 (week 44) included the pillar Safe and Dignified 
burials. This pillar was not included in the original response plan. 
“The Messaging and Dissemination subcommittee and Capacity Building subcommittee are 
working to develop messages to inform and engage communities and burial teams on safe burial 
practices” UNICEF Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report – Reporting Period 9-15 October 
2014. 
“Topics included: safe and dignified burials; early referrals of suspected cases to health 
facilities; proper isolation/home-based care while waiting for a referral; and the importance of 
quarantine” UNICEF Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report – Reporting Period 20-26 
November 2014 
It was also during this time that the intention to involve social mobilization pillar in the ac-
tivities of the other ones was reported after the Social Mobilization Implementing Partners Fo-
rum held on 30 of January 2015.  
“The Forum agreed on three key commitments, (i) included intense integration of Social 
Mobilization across other pillars to focus on cases, contacts and burials, (ii) targeting at chiefdom 
level to improve quality and rapid results, and (iii) harmonization and increased utilization of 
strategic information.” UNICEF Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report – 4 February 2015 
Communication materials (posters, banners, Frequently Asked Questions brochures, Key 
messages pamphlets, etc.) were used during all the response plan implementation time but it 
appears that the focus was changed from distributing materials as the main activity itself to 
using them as a tool for other approaches. Along the outbreak timeline it was also perceived a 
change in communication strategy regarding text use in the pieces. In the initial materials it 
was more frequent to find pieces with long text in paragraphs and at the end visual messages 
were found more often (36,37). 
Actors 
During the whole outbreak intervention the participation of several international organizations 
was clear. One of the interviewees suggested that, at the beginning, the GoSL defaulted to the 
Ebola patients care to Médecins Sans Frontièrs. Along the reports and interviews it is possible 
19 
to perceive the deep involvement of international organizations. In the case of the social mo-
bilization pillar, UNICEF took a leading role that was formalized in the NECS, since week 
27/2014.  
“At the national level, the Social Mobilisation (SM) Pillar chaired by Programme Manager, 
Health Education Division at Ministry of Health and Sanitation and co-chaired by UNICEF Sierra 
Leone will lead and coordinate programme communications activities, the use of mass media, 
interpersonal communication approaches and social media to enhance understanding of the 
disease, risks and risk mitigation measures, putting people at the centre of the response.” NECS  
The NECS defined that the GoSL would be the coordinator of the communication activi-
ties and that the messaging and communication subcommittee would assure that messages and 
communication materials are evidence-based. This role is not really evident in the different 
reports but it was clear the participation of a diverse group of organizations in different health 
communication campaigns. 
UNICEF is not the only international organization leading a pillar. The GoSL has assigned 
at least one of international organizations to co-chair the remaining pillars (38): 
 Case Management - Pillar leads: MoHS, WHO 
 Surveillance - Pillar leads: MoHS, WHO, UNFPA, CDC 
 Safe and Dignified Burials (SDB) - Pillar leads: IFRC, MoHS 
 Social Mobilization & Communications - Pillar leads: MoHS, UNICEF 
 Psycho-Social Support, Gender, Children - Pillar leads: MoSWGCA, UNICEF 
 Enabling Services - Leads: UNICEF, MoHS, UNMEER, WFP, UNDP, WHO 
It is important to notice at this point that the term pillar has changed from its first use in the 
ARP where they were called “Thematic Areas”. Later, in the NECS, those thematic areas are 
called pillars and they remained the same four. In the first weekly report from UNMEER, the 
last week of October 2014 (week 44) they mentioned five pillars, two of which were not in-
cluded in the July ARP: “Safe and dignified burials” and “Psycho-Social Support, Gender, 
Children”. From the initial ones, the thematic area “Coordination” was not a pillar anymore. 
In the response plan, several governmental agencies or ministries were involved. Regard-
ing the pillar under study in this project, it can be found direct participation of the MoHS and 
the Presidency of Sierra Leone. New bodies were also created as the Ebola Operations Centre 
and later The National Ebola Response Centre which responsibilities covered all pillars.  
Several sources highlighted the importance of community participation and the change in 
outbreak trend when the community was really involved. Within the community, several dif-
ferent roles can be identified, for instance the common people at risk of getting the disease, 
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the families of sick or dead people, traditional healers, local leaders, survivors and health care 
workers and social mobilizers from the community. It was possible that one person could play 
several roles. 
 “At the time was went on-- people I think really understood the community far much better 
especially that through those surveys […] aim was to engage the community-- now when you go to 
Sierra Leone you find that the communities are actively involved in the Ebola response…”(I2)  
From the local private sector there was participation of transportation, food market and 
trade, radio and TV, mobile network operators, schools and teachers, printed material provid-
ers and many others. One of the interviewees remarked the importance of working with mass 
media. 
“Because I think, for me, I thought-- the engagement of the media, adequate engagement of the 
media making sure that media is getting the right information and passing on the right information 
to the communities at all time was also very critical” (I2). 
Rumours and rumour bank 
Throughout the outbreak response, the health communicators had to face an informal per-
sistent opposition from rumours, beliefs and misunderstandings. In order to tackle them, a 
rumour bank was created to allow identifying the spreading of rumours and designing re-
sponses to counteract them. This kind of communication, informal, and most of the time lack-
ing scientific evidence, intended to improve the health of the population and to create 
awareness to avoid contagion or treat the disease. In that sense it could be considered another 
kind of health communication. Rumours could also use some of the communication channels 
which were used by the official messages, for example the SMS message talking about witch-
craft as the cause of the outbreak, the conversation about Ebola transmission by phone or the 
message on Whatsapp providing a supposed protection with salt dissolved in water in Nigeria 
(39). The data from interviews showed the importance of those rumours informing people (in 
a wrong way, however) and how health officials had to struggle with its jeopardizing effects. 
Data suggests that the influence of rumours was less important during the last stage of the 
outbreak however, it is clear it was present and had a continuous impact. 
“So, a lot of people have Facebook and Whatsapp, whatsapp is very, very big. In fact a lot of the 
stigma with victims was transmitted through Whatsapp, so people would, would send pictures” (I4)  
“Another friend had taken a position coordinating public outreach for the Ministry of Health 
and had fielded disturbing questions during a long information session in a remote village recently 
hit by the virus. The one he found most troubling was the man who asked repeatedly if he could 
catch Ebola through phone conversations with his cousin, who was quarantined. My friend 
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explained transmission several different ways, emphasizing the impossibility of contagion through 
sound waves. Unconvinced, the man muttered that the Ministry did not know anything”. 
‘Articulating the invisible’ in Cultural Anthropology 
“In several towns where the WHO reported an upswing in Ebola deaths, text messages 
circulated that these deaths were not due to a virus but to the fact that multiple witch airplanes 
crashed into densely populated neighbourhoods. All the witches onboard were killed, as well as 
some unlucky souls on the ground. According to my contact in the north, “This gives new meaning 
to the phrase ‘airborne transmission!’” ‘Articulating the invisible’ in Cultural Anthropology 
“One lady in Nigeria shared that salt in water, you drunk. If you drink salty water and you use it 
to take your bath you will be protected from Ebola. That kind of message is like having a pin in and 
you have a balloon that it is already blown to its maximum and you applied the pin on it.” (I3). 
During the outbreak in Nigeria, rumours also played a role. They also created mechanisms 
to tackle them. 
“So now we have to set up a protocol for rumour management, so that’s another health commu-
nications practice especially during the outbreak because rumours spring…” (I3).  
Lessons learnt identified by interviewees 
When asked about lessons learnt, the participants expressed different opinions about what 
had been learned, what should have been learnt and, sometimes, what has not been learnt. 
 “I think the lesson learnt from the outbreak is… from the very beginning when there is an 
outbreak I think information flow to the community is very important. And we are talking about 
factual information getting thru the community…” (I2)  
“Making sure that the media is getting the right kind of information and they are transmitting 
the right information thru the communities also was another lesson learned.” (I2)  
“Yeah, I think very specific with the lessons: Communication, so, communication among the 
health workers and the various districts with the ministry of health, so that has been put in place 
that if there is a case that looks like Ebola or looks very suspicious that need to be reported” (I4)  
 “But of course the main thing they need to learn is they actually need to invest money into 
health services. It is dangerous not to do so, it is dangerous for everybody and they can’t-- the elite 
can’t run away so the government can’t run away when something happened” (I1)  
“That they need to work with local leadership. That is something that it is often forgotten. And it 
is also part of the power game that you, coming from the capital you have. You see yourself as 
superior and people in the countryside are supposed to work for you.”(27) 
“The government should have learned a lot and the leadership should have learned a lot from 
what happened during the war and when it comes to include a larger part of the population but it 
seems they have not done that” (I1)  
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 “I would advise that you carefully scrutinize the messages and ensure that you factor the 
cultural and religious beliefs, and also make sure those who communicate with the people are 
important figures that people can listen to.” (I5)  
Discussion 
This project aimed to explore how the implementation of National Ebola Response plan in Si-
erra Leone can be understood using health communication activities as a proxy. In the context 
of the, so far, largest EVD outbreak it is important to understand how previous knowledge and 
approaches contributed to face the disease and how adaptations were needed in a country with 
a weak health system and no experience treating this disease. The EVD response in Sierra Le-
one has been characterized by quick and continuous learning processes in the context of an 
engaged and informed community. A graphic timeline of the Ebola response in Sierra Leone 
showing the five phases identified of the health communication was developed Figure 2. 
Components of the policy triangle 
Context: The geographic context of the outbreak quickly evolved from being a local issue to a 
regional one and finally to become a global threat. Adaptation to the development of the out-
break caused changes and adjustments also in the cultural context in Sierra Leone: the schools 
were closed, population gatherings were restricted and mobilization across the country was in 
some cases limited or prohibited. The economy and the productive sector were highly impact-
ed with consequences, for instance, in food supply in the forthcoming years. Many health in-
terventions as immunization programs, prenatal care and, in general, access to health care 
were affected. The transformation in the health system was very quick. When the outbreak 
started there was only one physician for each 33000 inhabitants and very quickly the disease 
took the lives of several hundred of the available health staff.  
Actors: New actors or new types of interactions among them came to this policy during the 
different policy cycle stages. Although in the “policy triangle framework”, the component ac-
tors is apparently showed as a monolithic element or at least treating actors as a single ele-
ment, from the experience in this case it is clear that it is by itself a complex subsystem of 
interactions, conflicting interests, message transmission and reception and, maybe, many mis-
understandings. In this context of uncertainty, the relations among the actors created a chal-
lenging environment for policy implementation. It was shown how a proper health 
communication process contributed to ease tensions and helped to achieve a smoother EVD 
control. 
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Content: The policy content was also continuously evolving. The initial response to a 
threat present in other countries was based on international experience and current knowledge 
about EVD. The initial response was implemented given the previous experiences from the, 
so far, largest outbreak case in Uganda. Health communication was included in the content of 
the Sierra Leone Ebola response policy from the beginning, even when the policy was not yet 
formally issued as the ARP in July of 2014 (week 31). This acquired experience during the 
‘non-written’ phase of this policy played an important role during the wording of the written 
and final version. Despite this experience, it can be said that the policy formulation stage in 
this case was done in a context of an escalating emergency in a country with no experience in 
this specific disease, in a topic forcibly included in the policy agenda in a totally unexpected 
moment and in a low income setting not prepared to handle a situation of this scale. It can also 
be said that, very soon, the policy document became only a general framework as the disease 
context was changing in a rapid way and the real response needed to be updated also quickly. 
Processes: this project focused on processes, the remaining component of the policy trian-
gle. However, if zooming in from the triangle overview to this corner it is apparent that it rap-
idly transforms again into another policy triangle. This shows that processes cannot be 
separated from the other three elements in the framework and they must take in account the 
specific involved actors, the contextual moment like snapshot in a specific time, and the con-
tent also specific for that particular phase of the outbreak response. In that sense, the study of 
the use of health communication during the implementation process of the Ebola National Re-
sponse plan is required to include all the different components of the framework 
The Ebola response in Sierra Leone could be seen as a number of iterative policy cycles. In 
order to reach these very quick and frequent changes, strong leadership from the government 
was required. This was confirmed in the interviews. In a context of historical mistrust against 
the government, this is an important characteristic to highlight. It is also important to clarify 
that at the beginning of the outbreak, that leadership was not perceived to be present. It be-
came more evident in August or September 2014 (weeks 35 to 40), when decisive actions 
were taken by the GoSL, i.e. change of Ministry of Health, country-wide lock down, KAP 
survey and changes in how to approach and involve the community. This can be identified as 
an inflexion point in the response. Those changes in the approach to the communities were 
only possible when the organizations implementing the communication activities gained a 
better understanding of community cultural contexts and learned how to correctly behave. 
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Changes in health communication approaches 
Health communication can also reflects that evolution, for instance, when there is a change in 
focus from mentioning printed materials and channels in the weekly reports to a more fre-
quent involvement of local leaders as facilitators of change. This is a shift of focus from mes-
sage to messenger and showed that both are equally important (40). The data suggest that the 
first approach was to leave the materials to talk for themselves and being more important than 
the interpersonal communication. Later, it was a change in the sense that the materials were 
only tools to support other kind of interaction: human to human. At this moment the role of 
local leaders seemed to change from mere channels for the repetition of official messages to 
advisors developing the right messages and facilitators of change in their communities as 
trusted members. This phase of communication strategy can be summarized as containing 
enough awareness content, creating a favourable environment, and being an invitation to a 
behavioural change with a rooted deep community engagement. Influencers can arise in un-
expected places and its power, trust and influence can bring unforeseen results (40). It appears 
that at this moment of the response activities there were also improvements in the process of 
providing on-the-ground feedback to the authorities or the International Organizations in 
charge of social mobilization activities. This change in approach was also mentioned by the 
interviewees and it is possible that it may have caused a small change in population’s attitudes 
to the government and NGOs. This could mean that communication strategies, duly applied, 
appear to have a favourable influence on the context. The advantage of this case is to propose 
that the capacity of Health Communication is the quickly evolving and effects of intervention 
can be detected very soon.  
Those changes in the approach to the communities were only possible when the organiza-
tions implementing the communication activities gained a better understanding of community 
and cultural context and learned how to behave. One example of such an understanding is out-
lined in the document detailing how to greet the chiefs in the communities (41). Greeting the 
chiefs when visiting a community is a very old tradition aimed to acknowledge the role that 
person plays in the community and the importance he or she has for the population. It is also a 
way to get permission from the leadership making easier to get behavioural responses from 
the population. In the opposite way, a conflict with the leadership can cause a total rejection 
of the intervention by the community, as it was mentioned in the interviews. In this point it is 
important to understand that those formal approaches were valuable not only from the com-
munication and social mobilization perspective but also when taking about the delivery care, 
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dignified burials and surveillance of probable cases. Behavioural messages must meet the 
right people in the right places through proper messengers and channels.  
Changes in messages 
Adaptation of communication messages is also a consequence of a better understanding of 
community’s needs. During the first months of the outbreak one of the key messages was re-
lated to ‘safe burials’, as this was identified as one of the main causes of transmission based 
on experiences from previous outbreaks. In the last quarter of 2014 (weeks 40 to 52), the key 
messages highlighted in the weekly reports changed to ‘safe and dignified burials’. The inclu-
sion of the concept ‘dignified’ reflects the intention to address one of the main concerns of the 
population about providing proper funeral to dead relatives. The participation of religious 
leaders in the communication activities and in the process of feedback transmission from the 
communities allowed the realization that some cultural behaviours are flexible but the funda-
mental worries and cause of those behaviours should be duly understood and specific inter-
ventions must be designed. A valuable response in that way is the creation of a new pillar in 
the response plan. 
The delivered messages were also dealing with people’s expectations and beliefs. At the 
beginning of the outbreak the general perception and also the official messages were that Ebo-
la was a deadly disease; ‘if you get Ebola, you will die’. That was combined with the fatalistic 
message on the absence of any treatment. If the situation was that, then what was the point of 
letting relatives go to the Ebola treatment centres when the health care workers could not do 
anything to save them? That was one of the reasons behind hiding sick relatives or bodies or 
kidnapping them from the Ebola treatment centres. Understanding those reasons for different 
behaviours allowed the GoSL to make changes in that kind of messages. From that point the 
messages “We can stop Ebola” were empowering the population, telling them that the suc-
cessful results against the outbreak depended on the people’s attitudes and it was not a fatal or 
irreversible destination. Messages and their targeted receivers were also updated according to 
the needs and the outbreak situation. This happened especially when the weekly case numbers 
started to decrease in December 2014 (weeks 49 to 52). While the western districts still had 
high number of cases, the eastern ones needed to move to a new phase. For instance, during 
the first quarter of 2015 (weeks 1 to 12), some Ebola Treatment Centres were in process of 
decommission (the process to change the use or dismantle of the locations used for Ebola 
care). The offer of service was higher than the demand and some centres which were formerly 
schools stopped working as health centres and were prepared to the schools restart scheduled 
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for March 2015 and later moved to the 14
th
 of April (week 15) due to an unexpected increase 
in hot spots during January and February of 2015 (weeks 1 to 9). The messages delivered to 
the community were related with the effect of decommission of those centres and where the 
people should go if a probable case is detected during the surveillance activities (also rein-
forced). That change in focus for a post-Ebola phase also involved messages related the return 
of children to schools. At the same time, the main messages for the population in the whole 
country were reinforcing the idea of the possibility of end Ebola and also avoiding compla-
cency, as the current Ebola outbreak is not over until there has been at least 42 days since the 
last case.  
Coordination among actors 
Communication with behavioural objectives can achieve the best results only if the rest of the 
response is ready to fulfil the requirements from people to lead to behavioural changes. After 
January 2015 (week 5), the interest of involving the activities of Communication and Social 
mobilization pillars with activities from other pillars was stated. The examples provided 
above show several situations when these activities coincide in time and place. This is a real 
big step in coordination of efforts during the implementation. It took five months or more to 
formalize this interaction but this have been happening before and this new policy content can 
be seen as making explicit the former implicit behaviours. It can be said that the formalization 
arrives quite late as the peak of number of weekly cases occurred in November 2014 (week 
48) but it must be stated that the preparedness or readiness of each pillar has been a continu-
ous learning process and it is likely that establishing this cooperation before could lead to de-
ceptions. During the first months of the outbreak a call centre was settled as a unified contact 
point for people, health care workers, etc. in order to get directions on what to ask or if there 
was the need of reporting a sick person or a dead body. The call centre personnel were duly 
trained and the communication capacity was frequently upgraded. However, the low response 
capacity from the logistic teams in charge of transportation or burials resulting in some calls 
only being acted upon, by the call centre 72 hours later. The communication pillar and other 
pillars were not able to coordinate the response due to insufficient resources in both sides. At 
the moment of formalizing the involvement of communication and social mobilization activi-
ties with the other pillars interventions, the response time was around six hours before the call 
centre warning and the team going to the place. 
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Five phases identified 
Figure 2 summarizes the findings in five different phases, namely: 
 Phase 1, Latency: The disease was spreading without notice. 
 Phase 2, Outbreak onset: The disease transmission and effects are clearly surpassing 
the unplanned response efforts. 
 Phase 3, Taking control: perception is that actions taken are driven in the right direc-
tion to control the outbreak. 
 Phase 4, Tuning: Standard response can now be customized to specific needs. 
 Phase 5, Recovery: Efforts can now be placed in recovery of the country and health 
messages are tailored accordingly. 
Communication cycle and policy implementation 
As proposed above for the implementation process, there were numerous and short term 
communication cycles. However, it can be said that there were also activities which could 
 
Figure 2: Health communication timeline – Ebola response in Sierra Leone 
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have a long term scope and other that are short term. The preparation of materials, training 
and building capacity and community leader engagements are activities of which the effect 
could be perceived several weeks or months later. Human to human interaction activities 
could be included in this same category although, depending of the specific message, activi-
ties and purpose, it could change among different moments. Delivering printed materials and 
radio or TV messages could be considered a short term activity that requires repetition in or-
der to create an impression that can be permanent.  
In that sense it can be argued that approaches which aim is to engage the community and 
involve it in the communication process could be expected having a longer term effect than 
activities in a top-down approach. The effect of well planned and executed long term inter-
ventions could be found much time after their implementation. It means that they have a time 
span longer than the communication cycle duration. They would, also, be more capable of in-
fluencing and shaping the context in order to facilitate the achievement of behavioural goals. 
Once long reaching activities are settled, the communication and implementation cycles can 
be extended. However, surveillance activities should always be present in order to identify 
signals that lead to rapid reaction from authorities and community. 
Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 
The findings about the use of health communication in the implementation in the Sierra Le-
onean ARP suggest that the initial implementation strategy had a top-down approach and it 
overcame a transformation in the way of being more a bottom-up when more end-users and 
the community in general was involved in the delivery process. A more conclusive statement 
on these different approaches along the time can be confirmed after a more detailed and com-
prehensive study covering all pillars included in the response activities. 
The GoSL assigned several international organizations to lead the response areas or pillars. 
Many of the available reports of advances and needs of the response were issued by these or-
ganizations and not by the government. In that sense, the agencies developing the reports 
could be focused not only on the global response results but also in their own achievements in 
order to show actions before their management, governments and donors. The rationale be-
hind outsourcing those actions to other stakeholders could be interpreted as the government 
intention to keep only coordination and high politics roles and defaulting to the operation to 
the experts. The GoSL and its agencies issued daily situation reports mainly focused on the 
number of cases and location of those cases. However, the actions conducting to those results 
were not issued in those documents.  
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Behavioural models and frameworks in outbreak response in Sierra Leone 
In the NECS, the GoSL used, at least, one of the most common behavioural models: the HBM 
to define how messages should be framed (28). HBM was developed to explain why people 
did not participate in programs helpful for their health status (16). As mentioned above, the 
GoSL included some of the original dimensions in the NECS and excluded the first one: the 
perceived severity. However, the already mentioned change of message from EVD being a 
deadly disease to a defeasible disease could have been trying to impact how the population 
perceived the severity of the disease. It could have been and unexpected desirable result. 
UNICEF used a different communication framework: C4D or Communication for Devel-
opment. For UNICEF, C4D promotes positive and measurable individual behaviour and so-
cial change. UNICEF’s particular approach embraces human rights seeking to create equality 
of distribution of social benefits (42). 
It would be important to understand how each one of the main actors applied the men-
tioned frameworks, including the Outbreak Communication Planning Guide from WHO men-
tioned in the NECS, and if they were strict in following guidelines or theoretical basis in each 
one of them. It would be important to know if the use of different frameworks provided a spe-
cific advantage, caused conflicts or had a neutral effect.  
At this point of the outbreak when number of new cases has fallen to ten per week or less, 
after being almost 600 per week in November 2014 (week 48), it would be interesting to 
know how the RE-AIM model was applied to monitor advances and goal achievements. There 
was no information on an evaluation of that kind publicly available. 
Summary of possible lessons learnt or achievements 
Based on the discussion above, the author identified the following main lesson learnt, by the 
government and international organizations during the Ebola outbreak response: 
 Understanding that the message and the messenger could be equally important 
 Change in message styles and communication strategies based on better understanding 
of communities 
 Achieving communication strategies mixing awareness, creating a favourable envi-
ronment and an invitation to action 
 Better understanding of the role of community leaders to well-designed health com-
munication strategies contributing to a better outbreak control 
 Changes in implementation approach allowing greater participation and feedback from 
communities 
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 A constant evaluation of implementation and the intention of a continuous improve-
ment based on data results was perceived 
It is important to highlight that recommendations or best practices from research on previ-
ous Ebola outbreaks and from other epidemics coincide with many of the ones just proposed. 
So, questions arise on why knowledge is not that easily transferable to other countries and 
why it took some time to implement it in a successful response. These questions remain un-
solved in this project as they are out of the initial scope. However, some steps have been 
seized by several donors replacing their disease-specific initiatives to new horizontal ap-
proaches in order to build and strengthen the health system. Sierra Leoneans should build alli-
ances allowing the country to build capacity to face the more prevalent threats assuring the 
continuous access to health care.  In that way, it will be able to handle disasters or emergen-
cies like the Ebola outbreak. In addition, the government and the local and national leadership 
could take advantage of the trust gained during the Ebola response engaging different stake-
holders in the recovery phase. 
 Working in these themes, although demanding a large amount of resources and an excep-
tional political will, would contribute to increase preparedness for emergencies both in local 
and international levels. 
Contribution to policy and practice 
Health communication contributed significantly to prevention efforts during the Ebola out-
breaks. In this disease more focus should be on prevention and avoiding transmission, rather 
than on treatment. Understanding experiences in a severe situation like this and interaction 
with the other components of response will help to build capacity for future cases.  
The methods selected for this master thesis allowed extracting conclusions from diverse 
sources. This contributed to the confirmability and credibility on the findings. Reconstruction 
of events and decisions is based in alternative opinions and resources and allowed certain 
amount of triangulation and identification of differences in opinions or judgements among in-
terviewees and documents. 
The findings about community approach and coordinated work of different response fields 
could be transferable to other settings. However, caution should be exercised as they are con-
text specific and space should be given for the identification of other approaches to enable ap-
propriate engagement with the population and successful public health interventions. 
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Methodological considerations 
The availability of information sources was, sometimes, limited. An easier access to sources 
within the GoSL could have provided additional documents containing more strategic infor-
mation. The focus in one pillar, Communication and Social mobilization, could also have lim-
ited the overview of the policy implementation process. It would, however, be extremely 
ambitious to include all pillars for the scope of the thesis 
Additionally the thematic content analysis was performed only by the author. A cross 
checking with a colleague would have improved reliability and could have avoided biased in-
terpretation. 
Another limitation is working quite far from the field, some contextual factors and ra-
tionale behind strategic decisions could be missed. 
Suggested future research 
The Ebola outbreak in West Africa presented an extraordinary challenge for the countries in-
volved and the international community due to the rapid change of the situation and the spill-
over effect on other systems. Further research in health systems and policy in those rapidly 
changing environments could provide additional insights about its complexity and the interac-
tion among the different components of the policy triangle framework.  
This exploratory project also provided enough insights for future research, on the same 
case deepening in some specific aspects of health communication during the Ebola response 
in Sierra Leone or in some other pillars from the experience and the succession of events and 
phases identified in this project.  
The fulfilment of the goals stated in the NECS based on the theoretical frameworks proposed 
on behavioural model and RE-AIM can also be studied. 
Conclusions 
This project has explored the evolution of the health communication strategies within the re-
sponse to the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone from April 2014 until April 2015 using thematic 
analysis of interview transcripts and documents. It was possible to identify five main phases 
in this health communication usage, each one characterized by a unique communication style, 
specific messages according to the outbreak situation or a different approach in the implemen-
tation of the response plan. Some best practices were also highlighted due to their utility in 
any future outbreak of Ebola or other epidemic outbreaks in low and middle income settings.  
It seems that the worst phase of this outbreak has already passed but it remains a persistent 
incidence of a low number of cases with the threat of re-emerging hotspots of the disease. The 
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involvement of the community should remain strong in order to develop behaviours that pre-
vent transmission and allow rapid suspected cases identification. 
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